Introduction
Frequent incidents [Huston2012] [Cowie2013] [Cowie2010] [Madory] [Zmijews ki] [Paseka] [LRL] [Khare] that result in significant disruptions to Internet routing are commonly called "route leaks". Examination of the details of some of these incidents reveals that they vary in their form and technical details. Before we can discuss solutions to "the route leak problem" we need a clear, technical definition of the problem and its most common forms. In Section 2, we provide a working definition of route leaks, keeping in view many recent incidents that have received significant attention. Further, in Section 3, we attempt to enumerate (though not exhaustively) different types of route leaks based on observed events on the Internet. We aim to provide a taxonomy that covers several forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of concern to Internet user community as well as the network operator community. 
Working Definition of Route Leaks
A proposed working definition of route leak is as follows:
A "route leak" is the propagation of routing announcement(s) beyond their intended scope. That is, an AS's announcement of a learned BGP route to another AS is in violation of the intended policies of the receiver, the sender and/or one of the ASes along the preceding AS path. The intended scope is usually defined by a set of local redistribution/filtering policies distributed among the ASes involved. Often, these intended policies are defined in terms of the pair-wise peering business relationship between ASes (e.g., customer, provider, peer).
The result of a route leak can be redirection of traffic through an unintended path which may enable eavesdropping or traffic analysis, and may or may not result in an overload or black-hole. Route leaks can be accidental or malicious, but most often arise from accidental misconfigurations.
The above definition is not intended to be all encompassing.
Perceptions vary widely about what constitutes a route leak. Our aim here is to have a working definition that fits enough observed incidents so that the IETF community has a basis for starting to work on route leak mitigation methods.
Classification of Route Leaks Based on Documented Events
As illustrated in Figure 1 , a common form of route leak occurs when a multi-homed customer AS (such as AS1 in Figure 1 ) learns a prefix update from one provider (ISP1) and leaks the update to another provider (ISP2) in violation of intended routing policies, and further the second provider does not detect the leak and propagates the leaked update to its customers, peers, and transit ISPs. We propose the following taxonomy for classification of route leaks aiming to cover several types of recently observed route leaks, while acknowledging that the list is not meant to be exhaustive. In what follows, we refer to the AS that announces a route that is in violation of the intended policies as the "offending AS".
o Type 1 "U-Turn with Full Prefix": A multi-homed AS learns a prefix route from one upstream ISP and simply propagates the prefix to another upstream ISP. Neither the prefix nor the AS path in the update is altered. This is similar to a straight forward pathpoisoning attack [Kapela-Pilosov] , but with full prefix. It should be noted that attacks or leaks of this type are often accidental (i.e. not malicious). The update basically makes a U-turn at the attacker's multi-homed AS. The attack (accidental or deliberate) often succeeds because the second ISP prefers customer announcement over peer announcement of the same prefix. Data packets would reach the legitimate destination albeit via the offending AS, unless they are dropped at the offending AS due to its inability to handle resulting large volumes of traffic.
* Example incidents: Examples of Type 1 route-leak incidents are (1) the Dodo-Telstra incident in March 2012 [Huston2012] , (2) the Moratel-PCCW leak of Google prefixes in November 2012 [Paseka] , and (3) the VolumeDrive-Atrato incident in September 2014 [Madory] .
o Type 2 "U-Turn with More Specific Prefix": A multi-homed AS learns a prefix route from one upstream ISP and announces a sub-prefix Cowie2013] , (3) the Icelandic Opin Kerfi-Simmin route leak incidents in July-August 2013 [Cowie2013] , and (4) the Indosat route leak incident in April 2014 [Zmijewski] .
o Type 4 "Leak of Internal Prefixes and Accidental Deaggregation": An offending AS simply leaks its internal prefixes to one or more of its transit ASes and/or ISP peers. The leaked internal prefixes are often deaggregated subprefixes (i.e. more specifics) of already announced aggregate prefixes. Further, the AS receiving those leaks fails to filter them. Typically these leaked announcements are due to some transient failures within the AS; they are short-lived, and typically withdrawn quickly following the announcements. 
Summary
We attempted to provide a working definition of route leak. We also presented a taxonomy for categorizing route leaks. It covers not all but at least several forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of concern to Internet user and network operator communities. We hope that this work provides the IETF community a basis for pursuing possible BGP enhancements for route leak detection and mitigation.
Security Considerations
No security considerations apply since this is a problem definition document.
IANA Considerations
No updates to the registries are suggested by this document.
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